Export Controls

What are Export Controls?

Research and education thrive at Mines as a direct result of our many international partnerships. However, laws and agency regulations restrict the export of certain items and information. Mines complies fully with these legal requirements by following our published Procedures (hyperlink). An export is anything sent or carried to another country, including mail, shipments, luggage or carry-ons, and email, phone, or social media. Not only that, but sharing information with international visitors in the U.S. is deemed an export as well.

Exports are controlled based on the item or information, the country, organization, or person involved. The Departments of State, Commerce, Energy, and the Treasury, among others, regulate certain exports. In some cases, we must secure a license from one of these agencies before granting access in the U.S. or transferring an item or information overseas.

What do we need to do as mines employees or students?

First, we have to identify situations in which export controls may affect us. Then, we may need to establish a plan for protecting the controlled items or technology or obtain a federal license. A representative from Research and Tech Transfer is available to meet with you, your department, or members of your lab.

What sorts of activities are impacted by export controls?

Many of the activities that we at Mines do every day could be affected by export controls. For example, this includes:

• Research agreements that limit the nationality of research team members or require us to seek sponsor approval to publish the results
• Research with nuclear energy, space technology, lasers or sensors, encryption, high performance computing, or military applications
• Research relying on proprietary or confidential information
• Research with international partners or visiting scholars
• Procurement and use of controlled equipment
• International consulting
• Hosting international visitors
• Travel abroad with scientific instruments or proprietary data
• Travel to certain countries with laptops or electronic devices
• Teaching overseas
• International shipping of items or information overseas

When in doubt, ask us at exportcontrols@mines.edu.

What if I have foreign national graduate students in my lab—are licenses required?

It depends. If you have foreign national grad students working only on Fundamental Research, then you likely will not require a license to continue the work. However, it is recommended to perform a laboratory assessment both of the technology, items, equipment, or source code in use to ensure that there is not something or some work that will except the research from Fundamental Research designation. Please contact us for more information: exportcontrols@mines.edu

Isn’t all my research, scholarship, or teaching Fundamental Research?

Not necessarily.  While Mines is a Fundamental Research university and we start the consideration from that premise, some technology, information, or items used or transferred may fall outside the Fundamental Research Exception (FRE). Please consult the Decision Trees or contact ORA for more information on the topic.

Where can I obtain more training on export control processes?

The Department of Commerce, through the Bureau of Business & Industry (BIS) provides some online resources for the public. See BIS website, https://www.export.gov/Export-Guides.

Training classes are also available through CITI.  For more information or for department or unit training, please contact us at exportcontrols@mines.edu.

Are there exceptions to export control restrictions over the activities or information mentioned above?

Yes. However, the exceptions to the export control restrictions on technology, information, or activities each require analysis. Generally, these start with the Mines’ position that we focus on Fundamental Research as defined under both ITAR and EAR. However, the term Fundamental Research is not automatically applied to U.S. universities under ITAR/EAR. For example:

• International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR):  If the technology is ITAR-controlled, but the research is occurring on a U.S. university campus and the results are fully published (in the public domain), usually there can be a Fundamental Research exception to the export controls determination.
  • Note 1:  If the info is already published, but it relates to/involves a “Defense Article” (on the U.S. Munitions List), then an analysis of the activity to determine if a Defense Service will be performed must occur.
    • The FRE may or may not be available as an option to university researchers; thus, further review and analysis is required and includes documentation of the analysis and record keeping for at least 5 years following the analysis.
  • Note 2:  Equipment developed under the Fundamental Research exception is not automatically excluded from export controls/ITAR if it meets USML criteria.
• Export Administration Regulations (EAR): University-based research (basic and applied science or engineering) that is conducted by scientists, engineers, or students at an accredited U.S. university and that is publicly available (e.g., no restriction on publication) is normally (but not always) considered Fundamental Research. Again, an analysis is key to the process.

Effective August 2020, federal government agencies may no longer contract with universities, companies, and other organizations that make use of certain telecommunications or video equipment manufactured by specific companies that Congress has determined present a risk to secure communications.

View the full statement and list of prohibited manufacturers

Some of the following articles may require a subscription, but we wanted to share the headlines and sources nonetheless. Apologies for any inconvenience.

“A jury finds a Kansas scholar guilty of fraud and hiding ties to China” John Ruwitch. NPR, April 7, 2022

“NEW INITIATIVES TO RECRUIT, RETAIN FOREIGN STEM TALENT ANNOUNCED” Roy Maurer. Society for Human Resource Management, February 1, 2022

“NSPM-33 GUIDANCE: KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR FEDERALLYFUNDED RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS” Hogan Lovells. Lexology, January 31, 2022

“Prosecutors Recommend Dropping Charges Against MIT Professor” Elizabeth Redden. Inside Higher Ed, January 18, 2022

“To protect sensitive data, IT security and researchers must act as teammates” Emily Bamforth. EDScoop, October 19, 2021

“Seeing Through China’s Lens: The Origins and Manifestations of China’s Worldview” Viola Tian and Alison Zihan Pang. NATO Association of Canada, September 2021

“The Next 75 Years of US Science and Innovation Policy: An Introduction” Robert W. Conn, Michael M. Crow, Cynthia A. Friend, and Marcia McNutt. Issues in Science and Technology, July 12, 2021

“On Transparency and Foreign Funding of U.S. Think Tanks” Michael R. Pompeo. U.S. Department of State, October 13, 2020

“US investigations of Chinese scientists expand focus to military ties” Nidhi Subbaraman. Nautre, September 9, 2020

“Federal Acquisition Regulation: Prohibition on Contracting With Entities Using Certain Telecommunications and Video Surveillance Services or Equipment” DOD, GSA, and NASA. Federal Register, July 14, 2020

“Advancing Reciprocity in U.S.- China Diplomatic Relations” Michael Pompeo. U.S. Deparment of State, September 2, 2020

“Race for Coronavirus Vaccine Pits Spy Against Spy” Julian E. Barnes and Michael Venutolo-Mantovani. The New York Times, September 5, 2020

“How China Targets Scientists via Global Network of Recruiting Stations” Kate O’Keeffe and Aruna Viswanatha. The Wall Street Journal, August 20, 2020

“FBI: Chinese researcher caught trying to fly to China with stolen bio-inspired computer code” David Schwartz. Tech Transfer Central, September 1, 2020

“NASA Researcher Arrested for False Statements and Wire Fraud in Relation to China’s Talents Program” U.S. Department of Justice, Austust 24, 2020

“Hunting the Phoenix” Alex Joske. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, August 20, 2020

“Filing: Kansas prof’s prosecution criminalizes job disputes”  Roxana Hegeman and Eric Tucker. The Washington Post, August 14, 2020

“China’s research-misconduct rules target ‘paper mills’ that churn out fake studies” Smriti Mallapaty. Nature, Augsut 21, 2020

“U.S. Turns Up Heat on Colleges’ Foreign Ties” Karin Fischer. The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 8, 2020

“How to Stop Science Theft” Mary Sue Coleman. Scientific American, April 7, 2020

“Companies pay DOJ fine for Discrimination, Immigration and Nationality Act violation“

Viswanatha, Aruna and Kate O’Keeffe, “Harvard Chemistry Chairman Charged on Alleged Undisclosed Ties to China,” Wall Street Journal, Jan 28, 2020,

“Another Academic Ensnared in Chinese Recruitment Program” Bill Gertz, The Washington Times, March 11, 2020

“The Trump Administration Drove Him Back to China, Where He Invented a Fast Coronavirus Test” David Armstrong, Annie Waldman and Daniel Golden, ProPublica, March 18, 2020

“After $5.5M FCA Settlement, Institutions Face Bigger Risks for Mishandling Foreign Support,” Health Care Compliance Association, Report on Research Compliance, vol. 17, no. 2, Jan 23, 2020,